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NOTE AND COMMENT
JAMtS H. BRtWS'ttR.-Thousands of alumni and former students of the
Law School will learn with deep regret of the sudden death of Professor
Brewster in Denver, Colorado, on October 7, 1920.
Professor Brewster was born in New Haven, Connecticut, April 6, 1856,
the son of Rev. Joseph and Sarah Bunce Brewster. He was educated at the
Hopkins Grammar School and New Haven public schools and was graduated
with the degree of Ph.B. from Sheffield Scientific School, Yale, 1877, and
from the Law School of the same University with the degree of LL.B. in
l87g. From 1883 to 1897 he practiced law in Detroit at which place, on June
28, 1888, he was married to Miss Frances Stanton. In 1897 he was made
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, and from 1903 until the
severance of his connection with the Law School in 1910 as a re.suit of ill
health, he was Editor-in-Chief of this Review. His well-known book,
BRtwsTtR ONi CoNVtYANCING, was the result of his work and lectures on that
subject in the Law School. After recovering, in a measure, his health, Professor Brewster taught for a time in the Law School of the University of
Colorado. For several years, however, he had been in the active practice of
his profession in Denver.
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Former students of Professor Brewster will remember him for his broad
interests, his geniality, and kindness. As a teacher of law, he was remarkable in his clearness of thought and expression: Members of the student
editorial board of this Review during the period covered by his editorship,
who came into much closer contact with him than did the student body generally, ov.:e him a great deal for his stimulating personality and scholarship.

PR:r<$ REGULATION UND!tR TH:i;: PoLict Powa-A recent Indiana law providing for the regulation of prices at which all coal moving in intra-state
commerce in the state may be sold, has just received the sanction of the
District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana." The case
arose upon a bill of complaint filed by one of the operating companies to
enjoin the commission created by the Act from entering upon any of its
duties. Several aspects of the bill were deemed by the court to be premature
but the vital point in controversy was adjudicated, namely, as to whether or
not the state has any power at all to regulate profits arising from the industry.
In denying the injunction and dismissing the bill the court added one more
to the already large number of "businesses affected with the public interest"
of which phrase the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "We can
best explain by examples."" Inasmuch as the opinion was rendered by a court
consisting of two circuit judges and one district judge it would seem to be
entitled to ~lmost if not qUite as niuch weight as though rendered by a Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The phrase "business affected with the public interest~' was first' used in
ibis country in
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Waite in the i::ase of
.Munn v. Illinois," decided in 1876, holding that the business of storing grain
:in elevators was so affected and is there quoted from an old treatise' of Lord
-Chief Justice Hale. As applied in that and succeeding cases it has seemed
to mean no more than this, that there are certain classes of businesses which
may be regulated by the state to a greater extent than others to which the
term "purely private" has been applied. No precise test has so far been laid
down by. the Supreme Court by means of which the limits of these two classes
can be distinguished. The attitude thus far steadfastly adhered to by the
Court may be illustrated by the following quotation from its most important
recent decision upon the point, German Alliance J11s11rance Co. v. Lewis.'
After reviewing at length the cases. following Munn v. Illinois, supra, the
court commented upon the group as a whole as follows : "The cases need
no explanatory or fortifying comment. They demonstrate that a business,
by circumstances and its nature, may rise from private to be of public concern, and be subject, in consequence, to governmental regulation.
'The underlying principle is that business of certain kinds holds such a peculiar

an

* .. ,.

1 American Coal Mining Ctt. v. The Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana,
# al, - - Fed. - - (Sept. 6, 1920).
•German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, a33 U. S. 389.

I 94 U. S. II3.
'DE P011.nBl1s MAius,

I 233 U. S. 389.

I
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Tclation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of
public regulation.'" In order to arrive at a conclusion, as to the nature of
this "peculiar relation," which will constitute a basis for formulating a reliable test as to when it exists, it is important to review briefly the historical
-development of governmental price regulation.
Businesses of all descriptions were regulated during the Middle Ages and
later during our OWIJ colonial period and in the early years following the
formation of the constitution with scarcely a thought as to the basis upon
which the power of regulation rested, certainly without the existence of the
power being questioned. The assizes of longbows, books and beer barrels
-during the reigns of Henry the Seventh and Henry the Eighth, and the
various Statutes of Laborers are not unfamiliar nor are the colonial statutes
Tegulating interest on money, wages, bread, ferriage, mill tolls, wharfage and
various other services and commoditie.~.· One suggestion may be gleaned from
a study of this mass of regulation- which sheds some light upon the modem
regulatory tendencies and. upon the nature or the peculiar relation already
referred to. For the most part regulation, even in the Middle Ages, extended only to necessities of life and this because competition as a protection
for the consumer was inadequate and distrusted.' The subsequent develop-:
ment of competition as an active force resulted in the laissez-faire policy of
-economics particularly characteristic of the first half. of our national existence• and regulatory statutes ceased because there was no need for them.
'Logically, therefore, it would se<!m that ·should competition again become
-inadequate the natural consequence would be the reappearance of regulatory
statutes in order to supplement it. During the inactive interim, however, the
absence of these statutes bec;ame so universally accepted that their reappear.ance raised a question as to the power of the state to enact them, a power
which was once unquestioned. Accordingly the necessity arose of protecting
the public where it is deemed necessary without revolutionizing the social
order. The court proceeded to meet this necessity in Munn v. Illinois, supra,
with the phrase ''business affected with the public interest." Businesses so
affected are subject to the control of the state to the e:ictent that the returns
derived from their pursuit can be limited. Businesses not so affected may be
regulated in other ways where their conduct affects health or safety for instance, but their profits may not be directly curtailed.
The contribution of the Middle Ages then is this: That where competition is inadequate to protect the consumer against extortion in securing
the necessities of life, there is precedent for governmental intervention and
the "peculiar relation" may be said to exist. It remains to be determined
whether the modern instances in which regulation has been upheld have
actually given effect to this old principle without acknowledgement.
Although the doctrine of "business affected with the public interest" was
launched in Munn v. Illinois and was the real basis for the decision, there
8 3 HEN. VII, Cap. 13; 25 HEN. VIII, Cap. 15; 35 HEN. VIII, Cap. 8; M'.Ass. REY.
LAws 1648; Fn:!JND ON POLICE POWER, p. 382.
• ROGEllS, Six CENl'IJllIES OF WoaK AND WAGES, p. 139.
• 28 HAav. L. REv. 84.
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was much in the opinion in that case that gave aid and comfort to the opponents of any and all government regulation. The element of monopoly was
stressed and a certain vague analogy to the common carrier suggested so that
it seemed possible to confine the "anomaly'' within comparatively narrow
limits. In Budcl v. New York," another grain eJevator case, the doctrine Wl/-S
affirmed without extension. In Brass v. North Dakota,10 which followed,
however,· the reactionaries who sought to check the development of the doctrine should have been slightly disillusioned. "This case has been frequently
cited as modifying Munn v. Illinois to the extent of holding the monopolistu.
feature unnecessary. The following language, quoted from the opinion, dis- •
closes that this conclusion is slightly inaccurate although the result is perhaps the same. "When it is once ~dmitted, as it is admitted here, that it is
competent for the legislative power to control the business of elevating and
storing grain, whether carried on by individuals, or associations, in cities of
one size and in some ·circumstances, it follows that such power may be legally
asserted over the same business when carried on in smaller cities and in other
circumstances. It may be conceded that that would not be wise legislation
which provided regulations in every case and overlooked differences in the
facts that call for regulation, but as we have no right to revise the wisdom
or expediency of the law in question, so we would not be justified in imput. ing an improper exercise of discretion to the legislature of North Dakota."
The case may be cited, however, ~s- the beginning of the end for all attempts
to limit the doctrine by artificial distinctions.
Munn v. Illinois contains the first of a series of dissenting opinions which
has been continued in all of its successors, each striving to repudiate or at
least to limit the doctrine advanced, by means of distinctions which the majority of the court have consistently disregarded. It has been maintained
that ·it is necessary that the property be devoted to a public use, that there
be some public grant or franchise or some analogy to the innkeeper or carrier
or some right upon the part of the public to demand service. In the opinion
rendered in the case of German Ailiance Insurance Co. v. Lewis in which the
business of fire insurance was held to be affected with the public interest the
repudiatiqn of the artificial distinctions which was begun in the Brass case
was conclusively effected. The court admits that cases can be cited which
support the attempted distinction:; but says further: "The distinction is
artificial. It is indeed but the assertion that the cited examples embrace all
cases of public interest. The complainants explicitly so contend, urging that
the test that applies excludes the idea that there can be a public interest which
gives the power of regulation as distinct from a public use which necessarily,
· it is contended, can only apply to property and not to personal contracts. The
distinction, we think, has no basis in principle, (Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U. S. 104) ; nor has the other contention that the service which cannot
be demanded cannot be regulated."
The artificial distinction having been finally cast aside in the case last
• 143
10 153

u. s.
u. s.

517.
391.
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cited the court proceeded to leave the phrase "business affected with the
public interest'' unrestricted except for the various examples which were
given, but made no progress toward a definition of any sort. So far as
previous indications are to be relied upon, therefore, from the point of view
of the Supreme Court, the principal case will merely add another to the list
of businesses so effected and the ccurt will presumably continue on its way
with no attempt to clarify the underlying principle upon which the doctrine
rests, or to provide a reliable test in accordance with which the fate of future
exercises of the regulatory power may be determined in advance. The district court, however, in the principal case attacked the question with more
temerity and suggested what seems to be a reliable test, besides illuminating
considerably the basis upon which regulatory power rests.
The court recognizes the old artificial distinctions to a certain extent by
dividing all examples of regulation into two classes, one of which includes
all public utilities and all cases in which there is a public franchise involved
or a public service performed; the other, a number of apparently unrelated
cases in which none of these elements appear. It is obvious that the real
difficulty in defining the phrase "business affected with the public interest" is
encountered in attempting to find a common basjs upon which cases of the
latter class may be said to re~t since the public nature of the first class has
long been conceded to be a sufficient basis for regulation. The court finds
the basis for the regulation of the second class in the "power of the people
to restrict the theretofore existing circle in which. a person had his life and
the one within which he had.his prcperty, to bring these down narrower on
account of the conditions that were found to be oppressive to the people."
In other words, underlying all these cases there is a common characteristic,
namely, that by virtue of economic conditions or whatnot certain businesses
have been placed in an advantageous position enabling those engaged in their
pursuit to oppress the public, and the latter is not without remedy. In the
latter class the court placed married women surety laws, usury statutes
despite the historical explanation, and the coal industry under its present
circumstances. Having set UP. the two classes the court says that when the
same evil is found to exist in both classes. inasmuch as the regulation in both
cases is based upon the same po!ice power, the Same remedy should be
applied and that since regulation of prices has long been the known remedy
for preventing extortion in the first class it should be applied to the same
evil when it is found to exist in the second class.
The possibility of reconciling all cases of regulation upon the basis of
the relation of the industries involved to the possibility of oppression was
suggested by Freundu. several years ago and seems to achieve all that the
district court achieved by dividing the instances of regulation into two classes.
It is true that the 11ublic utilities, for instance, are affected with the public
interest because they have received public franchises. They are also affected
with the public interest in the same manner that the coal industry is so
affected in that they ordinarily occupy a position of economic advantage
11 FREUND, POLICE POWER,

p. 388.
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which they can use to oppress the public. Possessing the same advantage
without the public franchises, if that were possible, the utilities would still
he affected with the public interest in the same manner as the second class
of cases set up by the court. As Freund" suggests upon the theory of the
necessity of businesses bearing a relation to the possibility of oppression in
order that they may be regulated it is possible on the one hand to account
for existing legislation without conceding legislative power with regard to
any and all commodities which may be selected, and on the other hand to
allow for new applications of this power. If this relation to the possibility
of oppression is an acceptable test, there remains a single awkward question
as to the court's right of review where the legislature has in effect declared
the oppression to exist.
The effectiveness of the test suggested by Freund and the District Court
<>f Indiana can best be determined by its application to new instances of the
exercise of the police power which have not been passed upon by the Supreme
Court. Such an instance is the recent Montana law undertaking to regulate
prices of commodities of all descriptions "from· coal to diamonds, from the
babe's first swaddling clothes to the corpse's shroud." The law was passed
upon by the District Court of Montana in Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyl~
and was held to be unconstitutional upon the ground that many purely private
businesses were included within its scope, the court admitting, however, .that
''businesses affected with a public interest" were a proper subject of regulation. The court made no attempt to. draw a line between the two sorts of
businesses, but said in effect merely that the legislature bad gone too far.
It 1s obvious that two factors are essential in order to enable those engaged
1n any particular business to oppress the public. In the first place, the in:..
dustry must involve a necessity of life or at least a product of great imp.ortance to the welfare of the community, and in the second place competition
in the industry must be inadequate to protect the consumer. Otherwise regulation is useless and undesirable. It will be noted that these same characteristics were the basis of most of the regulation of the Middle Ages.· It is
.also clear that no declaration of the legislature can force these characteristics
upon any business in which they are wholly lacking. The attitude of the
courts toward the finding of facts by the legislature as indicated in the passage of a regulatory act bas been said to be that of an appellate· court toward
a finding by the jury. If there are any facts at all tci support the decision it
will not be disturbed. In the tight of the test suggested therefore, the distinction between the Indiana and Montana laws is clear and the decision in
each case may be supported. It is a matter of common knowledge that both
<>f the characteristics necessary to afford the opportunity for oppression are
present in the coal industry today. It is a prime necessity of life and at
11resent tl;iere is a shortage of supply. Therefore the "peculiar relation" exists.
The business is "affected with the public interest." On the other hand, the
:Scope of the Montana law obviously includes a number of commodities which
u FREUND, POLICE Pown, p. 388.
u a63 Fed. I34- ·
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-can in no way conceivable under present economic conditions become instruments for oppression,-weapons with which their wielders can "bludgeon the
public." As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, however, businesses
which are today purely private may tomorrow, through a now inconceivable
change of conditions, enter the "public interest'' class.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has steadily extended the scope of the
phrase "business affected with the public interest'' without committing itself
to any definition or test it is perhaps unlikely that it will now alter this policy.
Nevertheless, the test suggested by Freund and by the district court in the
Indiana case seems logical, fits all ~pplications of the power which have been
sanctioned by the Supreme Court and seems both enlightening and reassuring
as to the extent to which the doctrine will be carried.
A. W. B.
APPEAI.S BY THE STATE IN CRI'MINAI. CAsr:s.-Many state constitutions
provide that no one shall be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
Hence, after an acquittal by a jury the State cannot prosecute an appeal for
1qe purpose of securing a reversal. But an appeal ordinarily serves two very
distinct purposes. It not only questions the correctness of the judgment below
as a basis for affirming or reversing it, but it operates as a means for enabling the higher court to lay down rules of decision to be followed in subsequent cases. This is the characteristic common law. method for the development of the law, and unless cases can be appealed the law can never be
authoritatively expounded. To secure this exceedingly important result in
-criminal cases many States have by statute provided for appeals by the State
for the sole purpose of determining questions of law.
It is _quite obvious that when such an appeal is taken on a question of law
after a verdict of not guilty, the decision of the appellate court can have no
direct effect in that case. The dcuble function normally performed by an
appeal changes to the single function of declaring the law without affecting
1he question of present liability.
Now this opens an excellent opportunity for a technical attack on the
validity of the whole proceeding. Every new step in legal administration has
to run the gauntlet of that considerable number of judges who are instinctive1y inclined to consider novelty and unconstitqtionality as synonymous terms.
The statute under discussion calls for a decision in a case no longer pending
in the full and ordinary sense. The controversy between the parties, so far as
it is to be determined and fixed by the judgment, is entirely over. The
presence or absence of error is an academic question in that particular case.
Why, then, should a court bother itself further? Why not stop the whole
proceeding and refuse to take any chance of committing the judicial impropriety of passing on a "moot'' case?
In State v. Allen (Kan., 1920) 191 Pac. 476, this question is quite vigorously argued on both sides. But the reactionary element was in the.
minority, and the State of Kansas has placed itself in the list of States which
recognize that courts can serve the people in new ways and still survive. The
minority opinion is an excellent example of that extreme judicial conservatism so familiar to the student of legal history, though curiously enough it
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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

fails to cite the one conspicuous authority which squarely supports its conclusion. That authority is United States v. Evans (1907) 30 App. D. C. 58,
affirmed on certiorari in 213 U. S. 297 (1909). In that case the United States
Supreme Court held that deciding an appeal for the purpose of establishing a
rule of law to be observed in subsequent cases was not an exercise of judicial
power. The decision is illustrative of the curious tendency of the United
States_ Supreme Court to be ver;: conservative and technical in regard to
formal and procedural matters while showing the most enlightened liberality
in determining many questions involving substantial rights. It is in line with
the astonishing decision in Slocum v. New York l,ife Ins. Co. (1913) 228 U.S.
364 which held invalid a statute providing for the entry of a judgment notwithstanding a verdict where the court erroneously failed to direct a contrary verdict on motion made at the trial, and with such cases as Insurance
Co. v. Hallock (186g) 6 Wall. 556, holding a writ without a seal absolutely
void- on collateral attack.
Doubtless judicial power was not exercised in exactly this way at the
common law. But it is clear that one of the important duties of appellate
courts has always been tlie exposition of the law through decisions upon
points arising in the course of litigated controversies, and if the State is so
desirous of securing the exercise of this function that it is willing to enjoy
it even though it has to dispense with the normally concurrent function of
affirming .or reversing the judgment, why should the courts refuse to do that
m1;1ch merely because they find themselves unable to do more? These statutes
authorizing the determination of points of law are rather common and have
been accepted practically without question for many years by a substantial
number of our state courts. In Ohio such an act has been in force since
186g (L. 186g, p. 310); in Indiana since 1852 (R S. 1852, 381); in Iowa at
least since 186o (R S. 186o, Sec. 4926). In these States and in many others
the practice is well settled and commonly used. See State v. Laughlin (1go8)
171 Ind. 66; State v. Arnold (1895) 144 Ind. 651; State v. Willingham (1905)
86 Miss. 203; State v. Gilbert (1908) 138 Iowa 335; State v. Ward (1888) 75
Iowa 637; State v. Frisbee (1912) 8 Okla. Cr. 400; Commonwealth v. Bruce
.(1881) 79 Ky. 56o; State v. Du Laney (1go8) 87 Ark. 17; State v. Speer
(1916) 123 Ark. 44g. State v. Miller (1913) 14 Ariz. 440, seems to be the
only instance of a State court refusing to sustain the validity of such a
statute, due, apparently, to its being somewhat overawed by the action of the
United States Supreme Court in the Evans Case.
.
The practice has obvious advantages. Vital questions of law may otherwise be wrongly decided with no adequate means for setting them right. As
the majority in State v. Allen (supra) observe, the practice authorized by the
statute was criticised "not on.account of any practical evil consequences which
might be appx:ehended, but by reason of a somewhat extreme application 01
an abstract theory." That criticism of this technical kind did not appeal to
the court is an encouraging indication that, in spite of occasional relapses,
American appellate courts are generally alive to their duties and responsibilities in making the judicial department of the government responsive to
the demands of a developing social order.
E. R S.

NOTE AND COMMENT

81

Wxu.s.-RsvocA'l'IoN BY O'l'Hr:R WRI'l'ING.-The right to dispose of property by will is a creation of the positive law. In re Tyner's Estate, 97 Minn.
181. It is not a natural right and hence is effective only when exercised in
strict accord with the provisions of the law. Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. &>. So
accustomed are we to disposal of property by will that we may not be surprised to find some courts even regarding this right as one of the "inherent
incidents of human existence," as a "right absolute," which legislatures cannot "unreasonably regulate to destroy," nor "courts deal with in any spirit of
mere discretion." Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 21. Whether or no, as recent
writers have concluded, wills as we employ them were first developed in
Rome, certain it is that the right to dispose of property by will has been of
very gradual development at the common law, and has been and is almost
wholty regulated by statute. Until STAT, 32 fuNRY VIII, c. l, there could be
· no real will of realty, though by means of uses equity had opened a way to
accomplish much the same result. This first great statute of witts merely
gave the power, but did not prescribe the form of the writing. It was not
until the Statute of Frauds in l66o that any special form of execution was required, and then only in the case of the disposition of real property. In this
statute, too, we find for the first time fixed requirements for the revocation
of a wi11, viz., by some other wilt, or by some other writing, or by designated
acts upon the will the testator desires to revoke. As to these requirements,
and their curious extension by the courts, even contrary to the statute, see
17 MICH. L. ~- 331. The third great wills act in England, t VICT. c. 26,
1837, made no changes in the provisions for executing or revoking wills that
need be specialty noted ti11 later. Both statutes make specific requirements;
under each no will or revocation can be effective which does not comply with
the statute. A man may always change his mind, but he cannot make that
change effective upon the legal disposition he has made of his property at
death· except he fottow some one or more of the ways prescribed in the
statute. As I V1CT. c. 26 dates from 1837, it is not strange that the statutes
of the states in the United States are quite as likely to follow the earlier
statute of 166o as this one of 1837.
The New York Statute as to revocation of witts fo11ows the English
Statute of l66o as to the designated acts of change or destruction· to the wilt,
but it foltows the Statute of l V1CT. in requiring the "other writing" declaring such revocation to be executed with the same formalities with which a
witt must be executed. The Statute of Frauds made no requirements as
to how the "other writing declaring the same" should be executed. Under
each statute the sufficiency of a ~riting expressing an intent to revoke a wilt
bas often come before the court.
In the recent New York case of In re McGilfs Will (Court of Appeals,
July 7, 1!)20), 128 N. E. 194, the court of last resort affirmed the intermediate
courts (see 177 N. Y. Suppl: 86, 181 N. Y. Suppl. 48) admitting to probate
a will which the testatrix evidently desired to revoke. Indeed she died happy
because she thought she had done so. "But to revoke or cancel a written
wilt, compliance must be had with the statute." The court found that the
following note did not comply. "Dr. O'Kennedy-Dear Friend: Please
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destroy the will I made in favor of Thomas Hart." The note was signed by
the testatrix, and on the back were the signatures of two witnesses. They
testified that they signed at the request of testatrix, signing on the back
beeause there was not room on the front. The note was handed to Dr.
O'Kennedy when he was in hospital, and he was not discharged from the
·hospital and did not go to his safe where the will was until after the death
of the testatrix, and then he did not destroy it.
Revocation is not purely a question of intent. There must also be an
effective act. Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475. This note showed a clear intent
to revoke the wi11. Was it a sufficient "other paper" to comply with the
statute? The court held not. It merely showed an intent that Dr. O'K"ennedy
should destroy the will, and no doubt such a destruction following such an
intent of the testatrix would have been a revocation within the statute. There
are few American cases that may be regarded as on a11 fours with the principal ·case. Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 296, is clear to the point that a letter
by the decedent to his attorney directing him to destroy the will does not
ipso facto work a revocation of it. It does not show an intent by this letter
to effect an immediate revocation of the will, but instead an intent that it be
revoked by destruction by the attorney under direction of the testator. This
doctrine the New York case approves.
The New York Statute requires "some other writing of the testator
declaring such revocation." The ·English Statute of Frauds reads "other
wr~ting declaring the same," and STATUTE I V1r:r. "some writing declaring
an intention to l'evoke the same." It is not probable there was any legislative intent that these words should announce a different rule as to the intent
that must appear in the writing. New York adheres to the letter of the
sfltute and distinguishes between "declaring such revocation" of the New
York Statute, and "declaring the same," and "declaring an intention to revoke
the same" of the English statutes. Under the English Statute of Frauds
it was held that a letter directing the destruction of the will amounted to "a
present intention absolutely to revoke," "an absolute direction to revoke reduced into writing in the deceased's lifetime." "She died in the intention to
revoke the will, and in the belief that it was revoked." Walcott v. Ochterlony,
I Curt. 58o (1837). The English courts agree with the New York court that
the words of the statute are imperative. In the Goods of Turner, L. R. 2
P. and D. 403, per Lord Penzance, with which compare In re Evans' Will,
g8 N. Y. S. IQ42. The statute specifies the acts which may work a revocation. There is no other way. If the statute requires a revocation an intent
to revoke and a belief that the will is inoperative will not suffice. Runkle v.
Gates, I I Ind. 95. The courts cannot substitute for the plain requirement of
the statute the desire or intention of the testator, even though he may suppose
his desire accomplished, Tice v. Shipton., II3 Ky. i02, a case in which the
testator supposed his will destroyed, but by fraud of a beneficiary the deetruction was prevented•. This is true even iii cases where the beneficiary tells
the testator the destruction is complete and he believes it. In re Silva's Estate,
I(jg Cat u6. But in Bailey v. Bailey, 5 Cush. 245, Shaw, C. J., held that another paper expressing a wish that the will be destroyed, and executed as
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wilts are required to be executed, though it made no devise or bequest, was
nevertheless testamentary in character, might be admitted to probate, and
sc did work a revocation of the witt. The only difference between this case
and In re McGill's Will, if difference there be, is found in the addition in the
Massachusetts case of the words, "it is my wish that my estate be settled
according to law." The language of Margaret McGill's note at least suggests the possibility that she intended a revocation only so far as her will was
"made in favor of Thomas Hart." There were other provisions in her witt,
and why is the note then not testamentary? Compare In the Go<Jds of
Durance, L. R. :z, P. and D. 406; In the Goods of Hay, L. R. I P •. and D. 53,
and In the Goods of Hirks, I ib. 683. On the whole subject see the annotation in 3 A. L. R. 836, to the case of Dowli'ng v. Gilliland, :z86 nt. 530. No
doubt the courts do well to insist rigidly upon written witts and revocations.
Paro! evidence in the case of witts is dangerous, for the opportunity and
temptation to perjury and fraud are great. As said by Ld. Ch. Talbot in
Brown v. Selwin, Cas. temp. Talbot 240, and by many another judge in dealing with witts, ''It is better to suffer a particular mischief than a general inconvenience." But one may welt question whether the narrow interpretation
of instruments executed with alt the formalities required by the statute does
not needlessly inflict a particular mischief where there could be no general
inconvenience and make a statute intended to prevent fraud into an instrument of fraud. It would be no great strain to construe the note of Margaret
McGiU, executed as the law requires for a wiU, as indicating an intention to.
revoke the will at once without waiting for the destruction of the will by Dr.
O'Kennedy. How can parol evidence that she so intended it, and was happy
in the thougnt that she had accomplished her purpose, in any way defeat
*he purpose of the statutory requirement as to revocation of wills?

E.C.G.
Nr:nuLOus INJUNCTIONS.-Injunctive relief is sought against alleged
wrongdoing which is merely incidental to the conduct of a legitimate business. The wrong is established and the court is satisfied that an injunction
should issue. Yet some nice questions remain as to the scope and terms of
the decree.
The restraint should not go farther than is necessary to protect the complainant's rights. The business should not be needlessly destroyed or embarassed. If the defendant has asserted that it is impossible to conduct the
business without the incidents complained of, (as he is likely to do in
nuisance cases, with a view to securing a holding that there is no nuisance
or that, though there be a legal nuisance, the balance of convenience forbids
an injunction) strict logic might require that this be taken as a conclusive
admission 'when it comes to settling the terms of the decree. In view, however, of the fact that "impossibility'' is, in these cases, relative, and in view
of the public interest involved, it is good sense, if not good logic, to give
the defendant an opportunity to do what he has asserted is impossible, if
there appears to be the slightest chance of success, and such seems to be the
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practice. Chamberlain v. Douglas, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 582; Anderson v.
American Smelting Co., 265 Fed. 928.
At the same time, it will not do merely to enjoin the defendant from
conducting his business as he has in the past, for he could fulfill this decree
by varying some detail which would not at all remove the objectionable features. The court must, if posSI'ble, reach all wrongful practices of the sort
complained of, must throw the defendant back within the lines of his legal
privileges.
·
In cases where the circumstances are such that the rights of the parties
can be defined in exact terms, this principle is easy to apply. Thus where
defendant, who had no right to flow plaintiff's land, erected a dam which
flowed the land to a depth of IS inches, the decree ordered defendant to
lower the dam fifteen inches. Rothery v. N. Y. Rubber Co-., 90 N. Y. 30.
But in cases of nuisance and of unfair competition, it constantly happens
that, although the court is convinced that defendant has gone beyond his
privileges and has invaded the complainant's rights, it is impossible to define
these rights and privileges in terms that are at all definite. In this situation,
it has been a common practice to pass the difficulty to the defendant by a
decree which is little more than an order to cease committing nuisances, or
to cease unfair competition. In Winchell v. Waukeshaw, no Wis. IOI, the
decree restrained discharge of se:wage into a river "unless same shall have
first been so deodorized and purified as not to contain foul, offensive or
noxious matter capable of injuring plaintiff or her property or causing a
nuisance thereto." In Northwood v. Barber Asphalt Co., I26 Mich. 284,
the defendant was punished for violation-of a decree enjoining the emission
of fumes "in such quantities as to materially injure the health of plaintiffs or
in any way interfere with the comfortable. enjoyment of their homes." In
Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, the decree of the lower court restrained the operation of power hammers, etc., "so is to render the premises
of the plaintiff unfit for use and enjoyment as a residence by a reasonable
and normal person." The fault in these decrees is obvious. , As was said in
the last case, in modifying the decree, "The entry of an.injunction is in some
respects analogous to the publication of a penal statute; it is notice that
certain things must be done or not done, under a penalty to be fixed by the
court Such a decree should be as definite, clear and precise in its terms as
possible, so that there may be no reason or excuse for misunderstanding or
disobeying it; atid when practicable it should plainly indicate to the defendant
all of the acts which he is restrained from doing, without calling upon him
for inferences or conclusions about which persons may well differ." See
also, Ballantine v. Webb, 84 Mich. 38.
In Laurie v. Laurie, 9 Paige 234, the Chancellor denied a motion for
attachment for violation of a somewhat similar injunction, saying, "As defendant is bound to obey the process of the court at his peril, the language of
the injunction should be so clear and explicit that an unlearned man can
understand its meaning without the necessity of employing counsel to advise
him." This is perhaps an unattainable standard, but a wholesome one to
aim at. Of course it is not likely that any court would impose any serious
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punishment upon a party who atte~pted in good faith to observe a decree,
although it found that he had done so. Good faith is welt recognized as a
circumstance mitigating contempt. 22 Cvc. 1026. See Northwest v. Barber
Asphalt Co,. supra. But no one would contend that this cures the ill. To
enter an obscure decree and invite the defendant to throw himself upon the
clemency of the court, is neither fair to the defendant nor to the complainant,
nor is it a dignified way to administer justice. We do, however, in the unfair
trade cases, find some courts taking the extraordinary position that uncertainty in the decree is of positive merit. In Charles E. Hires Co. v. Cor,.mmers Co., loo Fed. 8og, 813, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
said, "(The court) is not called upon to decide whether a new label proposed
for adoption would infringe."
"This is especially so here, where the infringement was deliberate and
designed. In such case the court ought not to say how near the infringer
may lawfully approximate the label of the complainant, but should place the
burden upon the guilty party of deciding for himself how near he may with
safety drive to the edge of the precipice, and whether it be not better for him
to keep as far from it as possible." A decree was ordered enjoining defendant from using labels or bottles "calculated to deceive purchasers," etc. It
has been sought to support this view with the familiar maxim that equity
will not aid a wrongdoer (Oneida Community v. Oneida Trap Co., 168 N. Y.
App. Div. 769), but this is inappropriate as applied to a defendant who is not
seeking affirmative relief but merely asking that the decree against him be
made certain. If this position has any justification, it lies in the circumstance
that in cases of this type the· defendant has no "equity" to hew close to the
line, and if he does not insist upon hewing close will have no difficulty in
avoiding a contempt. Even in this type of cases, the practice is not uniform.
Coca Cola v. Gay Ola Co., 2II Fed. 942. And see Nms, UNFAIR Co"MPSTITION,
§ 367, ff. It would seem that, although the defendant may have no equity to
ask the court to aid to "drive to the edge of the precipice," it is sound and
convenient practice to give the defendant an opportunity to submit a proposed remedy which, if it is approved by complainant or is clearly within the
.defendant's rights, should be approved (that is to say, excepted from the general terms of the decree). When we turn from 'this type of case to cases of
nuisance, incident to the prosecution of a legitimate business and difficult to
eliminate without heavy expense and even jeopardy to the business, probably
no one would question that the defendant has an "equity'' to hew to the line,
and is well entitled if not to a decree clearly marking out that line, at least
to one which will not drive him "as far from it as possible."
How can the court best meet these demands? That depends very much
upon the circumstances of each case, and no general rule seems possible. It
may, however, be worth while to note some of the expedients which have
been used. In the unfair ·trade cases, the courts have frequently given the
defendant an opportunity to submit for its approval a scheme of reform, a
new label, a new package, a new name, a new method. NIMS, UNFAIR CoMPSTITION, S 367. If the defendant "drives to the edge of the precipice," the
-court may welt say that it is not prepared, at that stage of the case, to decide
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the point, and that the defendant, if he wishes the stamp of approval, must
withdraw to clearer ground. Cases where the defendant has an equity to
hew to the line are not so easy to deal with. Iri some cases the best expedient
will be what we might call an experimental decree. In Collins v. W ay11e Iron
Works, supra, the court modified the decree so that it enjoined operations between certain hours of the night, or at any other time save behind closed
doors and windows, saying "At least such a measure of relief should be tried
first." In Babcock v. New Jersey Stockyard Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 296, there is a
very interesting decree with three branches, one of which was a prohibition
of the keeping of live hogs on the premises for mor.e than three hours, reserving to the plaintiff the right to apply for a modification of the time,
"which is adopted merely on conjecture." In other cases, although a nuisance
is proved, it may be best to postpone relief till further information is gained
in regard to means of improvement. This was done in another branch
of the decree last mentioned, the point being referred to a commissioner,
with leave to either party to move for action upon his report. In other
cases it may be best to postpone relief while the defendant experiments
with remedial measures. This was done in Shelfer
London Electric Co.,
[18g5] 2 Ch. 388, and in Anderson v. American Smelting Co., supra. Of
course, if the balance of convenience runs the other way, it might be more
equitable to render immediately .a decree which would be certain to give
relief, with leave to the defeftdant to apply for a modification upon a showing
that there is another adequate and less onerous remedy. This was done in
Chamberlain v. Douglas, supra, and in Galbraith v. Oliver, 3 Pittsburgh 78.
These and probably other expedients are available. Equity boasts of the
flexibility of its remedies. And if this phase of injunctive relief is given
proper attention it would seem that we ~$ht wholly eliminate those decrees
which give the defendant "no rule of conduct which the law had not before
prescnoed" (Ballantine
Webb, supra), yet rumble the thunder of attachment.
·
E. N •.n.

v:

v.

Ditcr.ARA'tORY JUDGMtNTs.-That statutes designed to further the cause of
social justice should have to stand the test of constitutionality is inevitable
under our system. It is, however, unfortunate that judges generally speaking
are strongly disposed to "view with alarm" any such statutes that depart in
any marked degree from the beaten path. Unquestionably there is something
about legal training and experience in law, particularly upon the bench, that
tends to extreme conservatism. That our judges should be reasonably conservative in order that our fundamental liberties may be preserved and the
law kept steady, though progressive, through passing waves of popular desire
and prejudice no sensible man can deny. But there is a big difference between such healthy conservatism and distrust of new things simply because
they are new. "I have known judges,'' said Chi~f Justice Erle, "bred in the
world of legal studies, who delighted- in nothing so much as in a strong
decision. Now a strong decision is a decision opposed to common-sense and
to common convenience." Sr:moR, CoNVr:RSATIONS · WITH DISTINGUISlll:D
Pr:RsoNS [Ed. of i88o] 314 Such a decision was that of the New York.court
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in !'lies v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 200 N. Y. z;1. It took, however, such a case
to arouse the people and the bar and the judges, and since that decision legislation similar to that then declal'ed unconstitutional has been almost uniformly
upheld. Thus the law does ultimately grow.
The Declaratory Judgments Act of Michigan (Act No. 150, P. A. 1919)
provided as follows: (Sec. 1) "No action or proceeding in any court of
record shall be open to abjection on the ground that a merely declaratory
judgment, decree or order is sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could be
claimed, or not, including the determination, at the instance of anyone claiming to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, of any
question of construction arising under the instrument and a declaration of the
rights of the parties interested." (Sec. 3) "When further relief based upon
a declaration of rights shall become necessary or proper after such declaration has been made, application may be made by petition to any court having
jurisdiction to grant such relief, for an order directed to any party or parties
whose rights have been determined by such declaration, to show cause why
such further relief should not be granted forthwith, upon such reasonable
notice as shall be prescribed by the court in the said order." In the case of
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., decided Sept. 30, 1920, the Supreme
Court of Michigan (Sharp and Clark, JJ., dissenting) held this act unconstitutional on the ground that it called upon the courts to exercise powers and
perform duties not judicial
The act under consideration was virtually a combination of Order No.
25, Rule 5, of the English Court Rules adopted in 1883, and Order No. s.ta,
Rule l, of such rules adopted in 1893, under which the English courts ~ave
entered many declaratory judgments. Mr. Justice Fellows, speaking for the
majority of the court in the instant case curiously brushes aside all consideration of the English cases and practice as having no bearing because
"* * * as England has no written Constitution and the English courts but
follow the mandates of Parliament the decisions of the English Courts are of
no avail upon th~ question now under consideration." The fact ·is that the
English practice is based not upon a mandate of Parliament but upon court
rule. See Joyce, J., in Norlhwestern Marine Eng. Co. v. Leeds Forge Co.,
[1go6] 1 Ch. 324 328. In other words. the En~lish courts themselves concluded
to undertake this "service to the people,'' as they have frequently expressed it.
We .are then driven to the conclusion either that the English courts do not
know what is properly included under judicial power or they boldly cut loose
from the beaten path oi judicial action. It is of course incredible that
English judges do not appreciate the nature and scope of judicial power, in
truth the notion of judicial power and its field were :familiar to English
lawyers and courts long before this country had an independent political
existence. When the framers of the Constitution made provision for "the
judicial power" they did not coin a new term or express a novel idea. See l
Br.ACK, Co:i.nr. p. 26g. The court points out that there are similar statutes in
Wisconsin (Chap. 242, Laws of 1919) and in Florida (No. 75, Laws of
Florida, 1919). No reference is made to the recent New York act (see
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W1cnRSHAM, 29 YAI.Jt L. Joui go8), and the New Jersey Act of 1915 (New
Jersey Laws, 1915, p. 184), appJ.ied in a striking manner in Mayor v. East
Jersey Water Co., 109 Atl. 121 {1919), is referred to only in connection with
construction of wills, a matter regarding which that statute does not deal, and
is dismissed with the observation that "this court has for many years construed wills . in equity cases * * * without question." Without giving it as
a reason for its decision the court throughout its opinion lays great emphasis
upon the danger and impropriety of making tlie courts the "authorized legal
advisers of the people." Mr. Justice Fellows says: "Before this court, with
its membership of eight, takes up the work of advising three million people
and before the legislature is called upon to increase the membership of this
court so as to efficiently conduct this work, it is well that this court pause
long enough to consider and consider fully, whether the act calls upon us to
perform any duties prescribed by the Constitution or to exercise any power
therein conferred." It is not uninteresting to observe that the English courts
have not been overwhelmed with the task of advising in the way of declaratory
judgments upwards of forty million people, and the Michigan Act had the
same scope as the English Rules. On the contrary, in Dyson v. Attorney
General [1910] l K. B. 410, where the defendant vigorously asserted the impropriety of making declarations of rights in cases of the type there under
consideration on the score that there would be "innumerable other actions for
declarations" the court refused to ·recognize such objections as valid, Farwell,
L. J., saying, "* *"* but if inconvenience is a legitimate consideration at all,
the convenience in the public interest is all in favor of providing a speedy and
easy access to the Courts for any of His Majesty's subjects," etc.
The court refers to and quotes from many cases to show that it is established by overwhelming authority that courts are not exercising judicial
functions in rendering advisory opinions to the executive or legislative branch,
and also that for the same reason cases involving merely "moot" or hypotheticai questions will be dismissed. The soundness of these positiO!lS may
very well be conceded. The inquiry remains, does the Act under examination provide for proceedings leading to a judgment which is merely advisory?
and does it call upon the court to express opinions upon purely hypothetical
situations?
· Bottom is struck cnly when one comes to the inquiry as to what is judiciat
power. There are many cases which have discussed the subject and many
definitions have been essayed by courts and writers. Some of these definitions standing alone clearly would exclude cases looking to mere declarations
of rights, sometimes other definitions found even in the same opinion would
as clearly include such proceedings. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346,
upon which the court in the principal case relied very strongly, is a splendid
example of this. Out of the mass of cases can there be found some dividing
line, some test by which a new situation may be determined? It does not help
any to say that if the conclusion is final judicial power has been exercised,
for that begs the whole question.
Surely it must be clear that the essence of judicial power is the power
to make decisions. But that does not take us far enough. What kinds of
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decisions? or decisions in what situations? Since law operates only in respect of actual facts, it would seem fair to say that judicial decisions must be
in respect to controversies in actual as distinguished from hypothetical situations. Obviously these controversies must be with reference to rights, duties,
or status in the legal sense, in other words, they must be justiciable. The
advisory opinion cases, then, clearly fall on the side of non-judicial functions
for they do not decide anything as to anybody's rights or duties in respect
of actual facts. They are not decisions but .opinions. "Courts do not speak
through their opinions but through their judgments and decrees." Heck v.
Bailey, 204 Mich. 54- The Muskrat case would seem clearly to fall into this
class, for the case is essentially the same whether Congress asks the court
to advise it as to whether an act is constitutional or not or Congress purports
to authorize Mr. Muskrat to ask the court to rule on such question. The
"moot" cases are equally clear. They are "moot'' because there cannot be a
decision in a controversy based on actual facts. Hence no judicial power can
be exercised. The English Courts recognize this, and in Glasgow Navigation
Co. v. Iron Ore Co. [1910] A. C. 243, the construction of a charter party was
refused because as said by Lord Chancellor Lorebum, "It was not the function of a Court of Law to advise parties as to what would be their rights
under a hypothetical state of facts." The case of Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 56 Mich. 236, which Mr. Justice Fellows says cannot be distinguished
from the one before the court, falls within this class, for the proceeding there
provided for by the statute was the establishment of wills of living persons.
It is of the essence of a will .that it speaks from death, during the testator's
lifetime it is nothing more than a paper with characters thereon as a deed or
negotiable instrument before delivery. A request of a court to construe a
contract if it sl1ould be made or to declare what would be the parties' rights
thereunder would present a situation such as was passed on in the Lloyd case.
It is interesting and important to .refer now to varying types of cases in
which courts have proceeded to exercise their functions. The most common
cases of course are those in which someone's rights have been invaded (whatever it is that amounts to that) and a wrong (in the sense in which the word
is used in courts) has been committed. To this must be added the not unusual though less frequent cases wherein there has been a threatened invasion
of someone's rights. The court in the principal case apparently would say
that only in these types of cases is judicial power exercised.
It remains to be shown that courts do in a variety of situations proceed
to judgment or decree where there has been no invasion or threatened invasion of rights, where they have proceeded and do proceed to final order
without anything more in essence being accomplished than a declaration of
the rights of the parties.
{a) There are multitudes of cases in which courts have entertained
suits to quiet title or to remove clouds. Defects in chains of title give rise to
such actions very frequently, and decrees are entered despite the fact fliat no
one is really disputing the ownership of the complainant. They are thus in
essence in a great many cases nothing but declarations of rights-ownership.
It is not necessary to start a court in the exercise of its judicial power that
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there be a controversy .in the popular sense. Very many cases that proceed
to final judgment with conceded propriety are amicable. The ordinary partl·
tion case is more often consented to than contested.
(b) Courts are every day entertaining bills for construction of wills, of
trust instruments, and for direction of trustees. What are these but declara·
tions? That the proceedings mentioned above are in equity is not any explanation; for courts of equity but exercise a part of the judicial power. The
statement by Mr. Justice Fellows passing off the admitted exercise by chancery
courts of the exercise of jurisdiction to construe wills that "such jurisdiction
has been exercised without question" hardly appeals to one's intelligence as
a differentiation.
(c) Closely allied to the suits to.quiet title are the proceedings under
the Torrens Acts to register title. There hardly can be found clearer instances of mere declarations of rights than in a large percentage of such
cases. See Robinson v. Kerrigan, ISI Cal. 40. Destroyed Record Acts such
as was upheld in Title and Docmne11t Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan .• 150 Cal.
289; are instances of a rather special application of the principle of the Torrens Acts.
(d) The not uncommon statutes which provide for the determination of
heirs without an order of distribution are another instance of a provision
fooking forward to a mere declalCltion of rights. While there is some dif·
ference in the language of the statutes as to whether such declarations are
final (See 18 C. J. 876), no question has ever been raised as to the constitu·
tionality of the statutes pro.viding for such proceedings or as to the proceedings involving an exercise of judicial power. There is a Michigan statute
(CoYP. L., §§ 13937-41) of this sort under which Michigan courts for years
have proceeded.
(e) That a state may constitutionally provide by statute for court proceedings to determine the validity of bonds proposed to be issued by irrigation districts was decided in Crall v. Posa Irrigation District, 87 Cal. 140,
and in Nampa, etc., Irrigation Di.strict v. Brose, II Idaho 474- See further
Kmm:Y ON IRRIGATION AND WATF.R R:rGR'l'S, § 1420. In Tregea v. Modesto
Irr. Dist., 164 ·u. S. 179, there is a dictum expressing doubt as to whether
such proceedings involve an exercise of judicial power, but nothing wall
decided on that. point, and in People v. Linda Vista ·Irr. Di.st., 128 Cal. 47',
the court adhered to its earlier holding in the face of such dictum. The
principal case is the first one to rely in the least upon that dictum.
(f) The Wisconsin statute (§ 2352) providing for an action to affirm
a marriage and that "the judgment in such action shall declare such marriage
valid or annul the same, and be conclusive upon all the persons concerned"
is another example of a provision for a declaratory judgment. See Kitzman
v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 3o8.
(g) There are plenty of cases in the books where a stockholder has
sued his corporation to enjoin its payment of a tax the claim being that the
tax was invalid. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107; Corbus v. Gold
Mining Co., 187 U. S. 459; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U. S. 10.
In such cases it is common for the party vitally interested, the Government,
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to appear only informally as amicus curiae for the purpose of insuring a
correct determination of· its rights. This type of proceeding is probably explained by Sec. 3224, Riw. STATS. forbidding a direct action to restrain the
collection of a tax.
In these cases the interests of the stockholder and the COrPOration are
identical, there is no controversy, and the suit is merely a convenient form to
secure a ju~icial ruling that the Government may or may not collect the tax.
Under a more enlightened procedure the desired end would be accomplished
by an action asking for a declaration of the rights and duties of the COrPOration as to such tax. So long as the suit is clothed in a familiar garb there is
no objection, but if the legislature were to provide machinery whereby a
corPoration in such position might ask an authoritative ruling in a direct
uncamouflaged proceedirig, there would probably be a raising of judicial
hands in horror at such Bolshevistic attempt (See opinion of Mr. Justice Fellows) to make the courts the "official advisers of the people."
(h) But the prettiest example of a case in which the final judgment is
purely declaratory is to be found in the appeals by the state in criminal cases.
See the discussion of this type of case supra 79. The objection to such
proceedings is, in short, that they come after all is over. In the type of case
under consideration, the principal case, the objection is that the court is asked
to rule too soon.
Other instances might be cited, but the ones above may fairly be said to
show the way.
R. W. A.

